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ABSTRACT 
 
We present a simple new technique to secure quantum 
key distribution relay networks using secret sharing. 
Previous techniques have relied on creating distinct 
physical paths in order to create the shares. We show, 
however, how this can be achieved on a single physical 
path by creating distinct logical channels. The technique 
utilizes a random ‘drop-out’ scheme to ensure that an 
attacker must compromise all of the relays on the channel 
in order to access the key. 
 
Index Terms— Quantum key distribution, secret 
sharing, network security. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From its beginnings as a theoretical curiosity some two 
decades ago Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is now a 
commercially available technology that is currently 
undergoing trials in a number of locations [1]. The 
technology offers a way of establishing a random 
sequence of binary digits between two end users in such a 
way that the secrecy of the established bit strings can be 
guaranteed. This bit string can then be used as a key in 
cryptographic applications. 
One of the biggest obstacles to the widespread 
introduction of QKD techniques is the distance limitation 
in optical fibre which restricts current applications to a 
few tens of kilometers. The distance can be extended by 
using relays. In standard commercial applications these 
relays establish link-by link keys. We have shown 
elsewhere how relays can be adapted to provide end-to-
end key distribution [2]. 
The major difficulty with relays from a security 
perspective is that they must be trusted; compromise of 
one relay will compromise the entire channel. Secret 
sharing schemes have been proposed to overcome this 
[3], but they rely on a network topology that admits the 
creation of distinct physical paths upon which the shares 
can be transmitted. We show here how a relay-based 
QKD network can be secured such that an attacker has to 
compromise all of the relays on the channel in order to 
access the information about the key. The basic principle 
is to create redundancy on the channel by using more 
relays than are strictly necessary for overcoming the 
distance limitation. This redundancy can then be utilized 
to create the distinct logical channels necessary for 
implementing a secret sharing technique. 
 
2. THE BASIC SCHEME 
 
In order to illustrate the technique we consider the 
channel shown in figure 1 consisting of the transmitter 
(Alice), the receiver (Bob), and 3 intermediate relays Rj 
such that only one of the relays is actually needed to 
provide the requisite distance extension. We consider 
here the pass-through relays of [2] but the method is also 
applicable to relays when operated in link-by-link mode. 
 
 
Figure 1. A QKD channel between Alice and Bob with 3 
relays. Alice and Bob need at least one of these relays in order 
to successfully exchange a quantum key. 
 
The channel in Figure 1, if all of the relays are 
involved in the communication, is vulnerable to the 
compromise of just one of the relays. All of the relays, in 
this case, have to be trusted devices. One way to mitigate 
this is to drop out the relays at random for each time slot. 
By drop out here we mean that the relay is switched off in 
such a way as to be completely transparent to the channel. 
Thus in any given time slot we may have 1, 2, 3, or none 
of the relays operating. 
It is straightforward to see that compromise of only 
one relay in this instance reduces the information 
available to the eavesdropper. With compromise of one 
relay the eavesdropper is able to access 4/7 of the 
information about the key for the channel of Figure 1. 
This is still too much to allow a successful quantum key 
distribution. 
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The facility to drop out the relays at random, 
however, allows a more sophisticated approach. In Table 
1 we list the possible logical channels created by the 
simple expedient of having the relays on or off at random. 
Each of these channels represents a unique quantum key 
distribution. Only Alice and Bob have access to all of 
these logical channels. In the last column of Table 1 we 
write the quantum key established using an obvious 
notation. 
 
Table 1. The possible logical channels created using the 
random drop-out of relays. Note that when all relays are ‘off’ it 
is not possible for Alice and Bob to exchange a key because the 
distance is too great to successfully use a QKD technique. The 
open squares indicate when a relay is in the ‘off’ position. 
Alice R1 R2 R3 Bob Key 
■ □ □ □ ■  
■ ■ □ □ ■ K1 
■ □ ■ □ ■ K2 
■ □ □ ■ ■ K3 
■ ■ ■ □ ■ K12 
■ ■ □ ■ ■ K13 
■ □ ■ ■ ■ K23 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ K123 
 
Alice and Bob now consider each of these keys as 
shares in a secret sharing scheme [4] and form a final key 
by taking the binary addition of these. The final quantum 
key is therefore 
 
=K  
123231312321 KKKKKKK ⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕⊕  
(1) 
 
None of the relays alone is able to construct this key. 
Indeed, no two relays can construct the key either. An 
attacker would have to compromise all of the relays in the 
channel in order to be able to obtain the key. 
The situation is even more problematical for an 
eavesdropper. Let us suppose that she has compromised 
one of the relays and tries to make it operate for every 
timeslot. In other words, she disables the random drop-out 
feature and tries to fool the system that the relay is 
actually dropping out as expected. Because of the 
quantum nature of the transmission this behaviour can be 
detected in the same way the presence of an eavesdropper 
can be detected on a standard QKD channel. The 
eavesdropper has no choice but to randomly turn off the 
relay under her control so that the statistics match those 
expected. Any deviation can be readily detected. For a 
given relay, using this simple scheme, we should expect 
to find it on for about half of the timeslots on average. 
It is also possible to consider more complicated drop-
out statistics where the frequency of the devices being on 
or off can be adjusted. This can also be used to detect the 
presence of an active eavesdropper. As in the case of 
normal QKD a passive eavesdropper has no chance of 
ever obtaining the eventual key. 
If the presence of an eavesdropper is suspected then 
Alice and Bob may choose to suspend the transmission. 
However, if the analysis shows that one of the relays is 
compromised then Alice and Bob can choose channels in 
which this relay does not play a part (although this is not 
strictly necessary because of the properties of the secret 
sharing). 
Let us consider now the channel shown in Figure 1 
when at least 2 relays are required to overcome the 
distance limitations on quantum key establishment. In this 
case the relays randomly switch on or off as before. 
However, we now need at least 2 of the relays to be in 
operation in order to establish a successful quantum key 
between Alice and Bob. Accordingly, the first 4 channels 
shown in Table 2 can no longer establish such a key. 
 
Table 2. The possible logical channels created using the 
random drop-out of relays. In this instance at least 2 relays are 
required to overcome the distance limitation on the channel 
between Alice and Bob so that a quantum key cannot be 
established for the first 4 logical channels listed. 
Alice R1 R2 R3 Bob Key 
■ □ □ □ ■  
■ ■ □ □ ■ 
 
■ □ ■ □ ■ 
 
■ □ □ ■ ■ 
 
■ ■ ■ □ ■ K12 
■ ■ □ ■ ■ K13 
■ □ ■ ■ ■ K23 
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ K123 
 
As before Alice and Bob can now consider each of 
these successful open channels as shares. The final 
quantum key can therefore be constructed by forming  
 
123231312 KKKKK ⊕⊕⊕=                         (2) 
 
Again, as before, an attacker would need to 
compromise all of the relays on the channel in order to 
obtain the final key. However, because of the distance 
limitation any single relay on its own never forms part of 
any key establishment. 
As a final example let us consider a channel that 
requires N relays to overcome the distance limitation. In 
order to be able to operate a secret sharing scheme we 
have to build in redundancy. The minimum we can 
consider is clearly just one extra relay. The final key can 
therefore be formed from 
 
NN
NN
N
KK
KK
KK
...123451...1245
1...13451...2345
1...123
..... ⊕⊕
⊕⊕
⊕=
+
++
+
                         
 (3) 
which is just N + 2 key shares where N is the number 
of relays needed to establish the channel. An 
eavesdropper has to compromise all of the relays on the 
channel, as before. 144
So we find the important and useful result that adding 
a single extra relay to a channel which has the minimum 
number of relays to ensure a successful quantum key 
exchange guarantees that an eavesdropper has to 
compromise all of the relays on the channel in order to 
obtain the secret key. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have presented a simple scheme for using secret 
sharing techniques on a single physical quantum key 
distribution channel that requires relays for its operation. 
We find that an attacker has to compromise all of the 
relays on the channel in order to obtain the key. 
Furthermore, we have shown that only a single extra 
relay need be added to ensure this security. This is an 
important result that could have a large impact upon the 
design and operation of quantum key distribution 
networks. 
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